

NATIONAL MACHINE TOOL BUILDERS ASSOCIATION  
MAY 3, 1985

I want to spend some time with you this morning discussing the state of industry in the United States and its future in a more competitive world. I would suggest that while "industrial policy" in the sense of picking winners and losers appears to have met a well-deserved fate, we will not retain our position of world economic and political leadership unless we can agree on and implement a strategy for industrial survival. That, in turn, will require the re-learning of some old lessons - on exchange rates, interest rates and tax policy, for example -- as well as some new learning to understand how our world trading system has changed.

A popular topic at conferences these days throughout think tanks in Washington is the deindustrialization of America. Economists, columnists, political scientists and other assorted pundits have produced reams of paper studying this question. Even though America may be deindustrializing at a rapid pace, I can tell you there is one real growth area -- and that is for economists.

The most interesting aspect of this debate, however, is its proof of the old adage, "Where you stand depends on where you sit." Most economists, who have never made anything, have rejected the deindustrialization argument, because it does not conform to conventional theories.

Most businessmen, on the other hand, understand the argument very well because of their own experience with increased imports from foreign competitors and restricted access to foreign markets.

By now, however, our trade and investment problems have been so serious for so long, that even economists can no longer deny their existence.

Indeed, there is no better place to look for proof than the report of the President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness which came out in January. Among other things, that document reports:

- Beyond our \$123 billion trade deficit, we are losing market share in industry after industry, and not just in "old" industries like steel and textiles. In high technology, for example, we have lost world market share in 7 out of 10 categories.

- In your own industry, imports' share of our market has risen from 10.3% in 1974 to over 40% in 1984. Imports' share of the market for machining centers has increased from 11.3% to 56% in just five years.

In part this is due to market restrictions elsewhere. In part we have inadvertently brought this on ourselves. For example:

- Although we spend huge sums each year on research and development, spending on "civilian" R&D -- that is, non-space and non-defense -- is less than in Japan and Germany as a percent of GNP.

- Japan, with half our population, is graduating more engineers. They have the added advantage of graduating 1/20 as many lawyers. - American fixed investment as a percent of GNP lags behind Japan, France, Italy, Germany, and Canada, as does our labor productivity. As the President's Commission reports, "Nations that invest more also have greater productivity growth. The United States ranks poorly in both of these areas when compared to our major trading partners."

- Over the past twenty years, real rates of return on manufacturing assets have declined. In the past four years they have fallen below the rates for alternative investments. We are sending investors a clear signal about where they should put their money.

- And we are raising the cost of that money. Our savings rate lags behind our developed trading partners, while our cost of capital is much higher, twice as high as Japan's.

- These developments are reflected in employment trends as well. Although we have created six million jobs during the current recovery, they are primarily in services. Total manufacturing employment is still lower than in 1981. And in 41 states it is below the level of 1971. Total employment is still below 1979 levels in 17 states.

- Finally, the overwhelming impact of exchange rates has influenced all these developments. The dollar has appreciated over 40% in value in the Reagan Administration. As the dollar has gone up, our trade and current account deficits have soared with them. (refer to charts) And companies have responded accordingly. Caterpillar, for example, is closing down two of its modern facilities here in favor of new production in Korea, Scotland and Belgium. That kind of action is irreversible.

These details document what you in this room already know and what the President's Commission has publicly reported:

"Our ability to compete in world markets is eroding . . . U.S. leadership in world trade is declining . . . The U.S. position as a world leader . . . depend(s) on the ability of American industry to compete both at home and abroad."

We have reached this point through a combination of missed opportunities in trade policy and misunderstandings in tax and investment policy.

In part, the international trading system has been changing faster than we can adapt to it - or even understand it.

For instance:

- The increasing sophistication and speed of transportation and communication have created a true world market. Who would have thought ten years ago that over half of America's daily supply of fresh carnations and chrysanthemums would come from Colombia, Israel, and Europe?

- The decline in the rate of domestic economic growth has made foreign markets more important, both to our producers seeking growth and to others who seek to take advantage of our open market for their growth.

- Developed countries have failed to pursue and successfully implement adjustment policies for industries that are no longer competitive, preferring instead to subsidize production and employment and export the costs of that policy to us.

- Non-western trade players have moved to center stage; yet their standards and business practices often dramatically conflict with the trade system we and our European allies created after World War II. For example, one of the critical new problems we face is protecting our intellectual property against the piracy and counterfeiting of unscrupulous individuals in a handful of countries.

- And we in America -- both smokestack and high tech industries -- know from personal experience how hard it is to acknowledge and adapt to the progress that some LDCs are making in industrialization, the other side of that coin is the LDCs' failure to accept the additional responsibilities that come along with development.

Now what does all this mean? It means that the trading system is changing too fast and becoming too complex for our policy institutions to keep up. Old rules, old practices, old philosophies -- like free trade -- do not fit anymore. Our underlying assumption of the post-war era -- U.S. world economic dominance -- is simply no longer true. And therefore our underlying policy premise -- unilateral free trade -- is no longer relevant. It may be ideal, but we are not living in an ideal world. and in a second-best world, you don't insist on first-best policies. Or, as my colleague Jack Danforth has said, when you have a \$123 billion trade deficit, maybe it's time to cheat a little.

These changes are challenges a healthy economy and a creative people can meet. The problem is the Administration's failure to address them.

Very simply, we have for 4 years pursued a policy of benign neglect of international trade and financial systems. Even more, we have been proud of our ignorance.

- the dollar's appreciation, out of control and out of proportion has become a sign of strength.

- non-tariff barriers imposed by others against us are really signs we're not trying hard enough to sell our goods.

- the failure of our manufacturing sector to share in the economic recovery is a sign we are becoming a more sophisticated economy.

- when shoe workers in Maine are unemployed, that is, apparently, in the words of one ITC Commissioner, their own fault for not moving.

- trade deficits, like the budget deficits of only two years ago, apparently do not matter. Although I'm still waiting for the supply siders to tell us we can grow our way out of them.

This approach to the global economy is like Alice in Wonderland. The effect of our non-policy is the same as telling American industry "off with your head," and the long term result will be to leave us with little more than the Cheshire cat's grin instead of a live body.

There have been some recent signs the Administration is waking up; most of them have come from the Treasury Department, notably our agreement to discuss international monetary issues with our allies and trading partners.

Congress is waking up too, but slowly. Recent hearings in the Finance Committee clearly made the case for better coordination of fiscal and monetary policy among the major trading countries, including agreement on coordinated intervention in the exchange markets as a part of that larger policy.

Congress also established the case last year in the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 for a more aggressive attack on non-tariff barriers. We have given the President the tools he needs for that purpose. His continued failure to use them -- like in the Houdaille case and the Administration's failure to develop a coherent policy -- will only force Congress to do his work for him.

Unfortunately, our tools are considerably blunter -- and more protectionist. They include sledgehammers like an import surcharge and outright retaliation like John Chafee's bill to prohibit Japanese telecommunications importers.

In the case of Japan, my own view is that such a hard line approach is both necessary and inevitable.

From a narrow point of view, the Japanese system has been extraordinarily successful. Through adroit management of their currency and capital market, through careful government guidance and the close cooperation of groups in their society that in our country are dedicated adversaries, the Japanese have created a dynamic growing economy well-positioned to take advantage of technological change.

But there is a cost to such an industrial policy that we cannot ignore, because it is we and others outside Japan who pay it.

In some sectors products that can compete are simply excluded -- blatantly as in agriculture, subtly as in many industrial products.

In other sectors foreign competition is excluded only until the Japanese have an equal, or superior, product. Then, when it doesn't matter anymore, the door is opened. The result is market distortion...perhaps more clever, certainly more successful, but the person with the better idea -- with the competitive edge -- is out in the cold, unless, of course, he's Japanese.

One nation practicing this system is a problem. If every nation practiced it, commerce would be paralyzed completely. Yet the trend, at least in Asia, is to copy the system, given its obvious success.

The issue here, of course, is not simply erasure of our trade deficit with Japan. The most optimistic estimates suggest that completely open markets would only eliminate about half of it, and beyond that I have no intention of trying to repeal the law of comparative advantage. What the Japanese must understand, however, is that their policies, no matter how good they are for Japan, have consequences for us as well. And we must act in our interests, not theirs. That is not protectionism. That is not racism. That is not starting a trade war.

Indeed, the trade war has already begun. Japan started it over 20 years ago, but all the casualties are on this side of the Pacific.

Right now we are locked into an increasingly destructive cycle with Japan in which we complain, they produce a reform program -- six since 1981 -- we wait a few months and then discover it's meaningless, and then complain again. They are unable or unwilling to take our problem seriously. We are unable or unwilling to persuade them to do so.

That is why I have introduced legislation calling for a twenty percent surcharge for three years on all Japanese imports. That will demonstrate our seriousness and break the cycle. A surcharge has been criticized as being disruptive. To my mind, that is the strongest point in its favor. We have to disrupt the current relationship if we are to build a healthier one. And that means creating in Japan the political will -- based on necessity -- to act and to change.

Japan, however, cannot be the sole focus of our international attention.

We need new approaches to opening up the trading system -- by encouraging our exporters and improving their market access.

We need to continue our efforts to remove our own barriers. Most critical there is our defense of the beleaguered Export-Import Bank. To destroy the Bank, as Dave Stockman has proposed, in the face of a high dollar and increased foreign competition is to tell our most sophisticated industries they have no role on the international stage. Aircraft, power generation- conventional and nuclear - and other major sectors affecting thousands of prime and sub-contractors are being told there is no alternative to surrender in the export credit war.

And we should continue our efforts internationally to defend the market system by fighting dumping, subsidies, and non-tariff unfair trade practices that distort comparative advantage.

I will shortly be introducing comprehensive trade policy and reform legislation supported by the Labor-Industry Coalition for International Trade (LICIT). I urge you to review the provisions of this important legislation, as it truly embodies a trade policy for the 1980s and 1990s.

And it is here where I differ from the suggestion by Senator Danforth, and also from a group of Democratic Senators, that we should hold new negotiating authority hostage to the development of a sounder policy by the Administration. In my judgment, such a proposal is a straw man which allows the Congress once again to avoid tackling the real issue, which is the enactment of legislation creating a more aggressive policy, in favor of continued discussions that have proven endless -- and useless -- thus far.

As I indicated earlier, deindustrialization is not just a problem of trade policy. Another piece of the puzzle is the failure of the Administration to sustain the pro-investment philosophy that was the hallmark of its first tax bill.

Today's buzzword seems to be "tax neutrality", whatever that means. Unfortunately, even if we knew what it was, we would be hopelessly naive to build our tax system without regard to the advantages our competitors' tax codes confer on their industries.

The Administration apparently still clings to the belief that we can grow our way out of our deficits, and that the continued rate reduction of its tax proposal will be the engine for that growth. But the overall effect of the proposal is to discourage investment and savings in favor of consumption, largely through repeal of Accelerated Cost Recovery and the Investment Tax Credit. That means the only way it could promote growth is if aggregate investment shifts to industries that are less capital intensive. In other words, investment will move to sectors where there are more jobs per dollar of investment - but they will be service jobs. The Treasury proposal is essentially a blueprint for the deindustrialization of America through the creation of a service based economy.

By definition that will mean increased reliance on imports of manufactured goods as well as the dislocation of thousands of Americans in manufacturing jobs. Such a vulnerable position is totally inconsistent for a nation that claims the right to world economic and political leadership.

The irony, of course, is that this is industrial policy - of the worst sort. It does pick winners and losers - and condemns an entire sector of our economy to the slag heap in the process. That the Administration apparently would do it accidentally rather than deliberately is cold comfort.

To make matters worse, our trading partners pursuing industrial policies deliberately are doing the reverse.

A recent study by Arthur Anderson and Company compared the U.S. cost recovery system with the other leading industrial countries engaged in trade with the United States. The study revealed that of the 16 nations studied, the U.S. ranks 8th in percentage of asset cost recovered during the first three years for machinery, equipment and industrial buildings. Luxemburg ranked first for all 8 years. Canada, however, for a 3 year period has one of the best recovery systems. If Treasury's proposal to eliminate ITC and ACRS were successful it would likely have the effect of persuading our manufacturing industries to locate in Canada.

What happens here if ITC and ACRS are eliminated? We would have higher taxes on manufacturing and much lower taxes on sales. We would provide incentives for U.S. firms to locate new facilities or expand existing ones abroad to manufacture goods for sale back into the U.S. Because of the relatively more favorable cost recovery allowances that are available in other countries, such as Canada, U.S. firms would manufacture abroad where they would pay less tax on their "manufacturing" profit, and sell back into the U.S. at a reduced 33% tax rate on their "sales" profit.

Removal of these two foundation stones from our capital recovery system would act as a strong incentive to American businesses to increase investment overseas at a time when they are already under

intense pressure to do so from the high value of the dollar in order to remain competitive with foreign producers. It is clearly a result that we cannot accept. That is why I have urged Treasury Secretary Baker to revise his department's proposal.

It is clear that the continued pursuit of trade policies that ignore others' barriers and the exchange rate problems and tax policies that ignore the investment needs of our manufacturing sector can only contribute to our further deindustrialization and sustained movement toward a service based economy. While services and the jobs they provide are important, we should all understand that this shift is irreversible. If we give away our industrial base through benign neglect on the international front and passive tax policy domestically, we will never get it back. And with it will go our position of world leadership - first economically and then just as certainly, politically.

Our situation reminds me of the priest and the rabbi who go to a prize fight together. As the boxers are about to go to the middle of the ring, the rabbi notices one of the boxers crossing himself. Puzzled, he turns to the priest and says, "Father, what does that mean?" "Rabbi," said the Priest "it doesn't mean a thing if you can't fight."

This morning I invite all of you to join with me in learning both how to fight and to know that fighting is essential - not just to win, but to survive.